Seen and Objected to:

The plaintiff's objections to Judge Markow's "corrections" to the proposed Statement of Facts are as follows:

1. The plaintiff objects because it avers that Judge Markow has demonstrated in his conduct concerning the "Written Statement of Facts" that he is possessed of a bias or conflict in favor of the defendant that makes his failure to recuse himself sua sponte from this matter an abuse of discretion. Examples derived solely from the matters relating to the filing of the "Written Statement of Facts" are as follows:

A) The court set this hearing to hear arguments of counsel regarding "corrections" without any advance coordination with plaintiff's counsel, who only received the court's written Notice one day prior to the scheduled hearing, which is completely at odds with appropriate norms of judicial behavior;

B) The Notice to plaintiff's counsel contains no date of mailing, or when Judge Markow signed it;

C) The plaintiff notes that while Judge Markow complains that the first paragraph of the "Written Statement of Facts" is inaccurate in that "this Judge did not order the filing of a bond", obviously, some Judge determined the amount of bond in accordance with statute. One would think that a proper correction would indicate which Judge did order the

bond, rather than simply state that "this Judge" did not order the bond, as if it were more important to portray counsel as providing an incorrect "fact" than it would be for the court to provide the correct information.. This also raises the questions of why this suit would have been transferred from one judge to another.

2. Judge Markow states that the second paragraph of the proposed Statement of Facts is inaccurate because "there is no basis in fact" for the assertion that he was initially undecided as to whether he should recuse himself from the matter. Yet, while counsel did not receive this information directly from Judge Markow or his chambers, he was advised of this by a member of the staff of the Clerk of Court, and it is a mystery to the plaintiff why a member of staff of the Richmond Circuit Court Clerk's Office would invent such a fact; furthermore, Judge Markow has not sought to correct the third paragraph of the Statement of Facts, which is entirely consistent with the second paragraph objected to by Judge Markow;

3. Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts regarding the dates the court was closed, is relevant because it illustrates the exceedingly short time period from initial filing in which Judge Markow entered his Final Order in the matter, without allowing for a reasonable period for plaintiff's counsel to set a hearing and argue his case, or, if necessary, to move for an

appropriate amendment to the pleadings. Since Judge Markow is not sure what plaintiff's counsel's objections to his court's decision will be before the Virginia Supreme Court, having not allowed a hearing on the Petition, he cannot be in a position to say that the facts set forth in paragraph 5 are "irrelevant to any decision or to the record".

4. Judge Markow has objected to paragraph 9 of the proposed Written Statement of Facts because it states that it is "argument" that "counsel did not have an opportunity to note objections to the Judge's ruling or order at the time they were made". This would only be an "argument" if adverse counsel or the Supreme Court were to aver that the plaintiff had not timely noted its objections for purpose of appeal. But for purposes of the Statement of Facts, the fact that counsel did not have an opportunity to note objections to the Judge's ruling or order at the time it was made is absolutely, undeniably a fact, although it is one that is not otherwise stated explicitly in the record. This is a fact which has obvious procedural implications for appeal; and Judge Markow's apparently vigorous objection to allowing such an otherwise innocuous fact is further evidence of the bias or conflict complained of in paragraph 1 above which should have resulted in his recusing himself. In fact, upon receiving Judge Markow's Order dismissing the Quo Warranto Petition, the Petitioner's counsel's office called Judge Markow's Chambers to inquire as to whether the Petitioner's counsel could reproduce the Order for reentry along with the written objections of the plaintiff, and was advised, "no", the Judge would not enter any further order.